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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of political insta-
bility, social polarization and the quality of institutions on inflation volatility over time and
across countries. Using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on
a sample covering 160 countries, analyzed in the period from 1960 to 1999, this paper finds
that higher degrees of political instability and social polarization, less democracy, and lower
de facto central bank independence are associated with more volatile inflation rates. Further-
more, political instability has greater effects on inflation volatility in developing countries
with lower degrees of central bank independence and economic freedom.
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1 Introduction
Economists generally recognize that high and volatile inflation is harmful to society’s wel-
fare. This realization had a strong impact on the profession, leading scholars to devote great
effort to fully comprehending the inflationary process so as to achieve price stability. How-
ever, few studies focused on disentangling the effects of high inflation levels from those
of high inflation volatility on welfare and growth. This is because higher inflation levels
are typically associated with higher inflation volatility.1 Friedman (1977) attempted to shed
1For a descriptive analysis showing a high correlation between inflation levels and volatility, see Fischer et
al. (2002).
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some light on the controversy, conjecturing that growing inflation volatility would render
the economy less efficient by introducing frictions on markets, and creating a wedge be-
tween relative prices prevailing in the economy and those which would have been deter-
mined solely by market forces in the absence of inflation volatility. This suggests that high
inflation volatility may be more disruptive to the economy than high inflation levels. While
studies on the determinants of inflation are abundant in the literature, scholars have not yet
extensively investigated the causes of inflation volatility—surprisingly so, given its ill effects
on growth.2
Cukierman et al. (1992) find that central bank independence reduces inflation volatility.
Some studies have related inflation volatility to other variables. Bleaney and Fielding (2002)
find that developing countries with pegged exchange rates have lower inflation levels and
volatility. Granato et al. (2006) and Bowdler and Malik (2005) find that trade openness
can reduce inflation volatility. In another study, Rother (2004) concludes that volatility in
discretionary fiscal policies has contributed to inflation volatility in a panel of 15 OECD
countries for a period of 35 years. However, this result does not shed light on the deep
determinants of inflation volatility.
Why do some countries have more volatile monetary and fiscal policies than others?
This paper argues that an important part of the answer may lie in the effects of political and
institutional factors, as politically unstable and socially polarized countries with weak insti-
tutions are often susceptible to political shocks leading to discontinuous monetary and fiscal
policies which result in higher inflation volatility.3 In line with Cukierman et al. (1992),
Acemoglu et al. (2003), and Aisen and Veiga (2005, 2006), we hypothesize that political
and institutional factors have a direct impact on inflation volatility which goes beyond their
indirect effects through inflation levels. Moreover, we argue that central bank independence
and economic freedom play a vital role in stemming the negative effects of political instabil-
ity on inflation volatility. This hypothesis is consistent with the increase in operational and
political autonomy of central banks observed in developing countries (Armone et al. 2006).
Greater central bank independence protects monetary policy from the influence of fiscal
authorities which may be susceptible to lobbying and political pressures prevalent in polit-
ically unstable and socially polarized countries. This hypothesis is also in line with Rogoff
(1985), who argues in favor of delegating monetary policy to a weight-conservative central
banker to avoid time-inconsistency problems of monetary policy and reduce inflation levels
and volatility. Similarly, greater economic freedom reduces the scope for government inter-
vention in the economy, discouraging rent-seeking behavior and lobbying, while promoting
fiscal discipline.
Using a panel dataset covering more than 100 countries from 1960 to 1999, we clearly
show that higher degrees of political instability and social polarization, less democracy, and
lower de facto central bank independence lead to higher inflation volatility. We also show
that political instability has a larger impact on inflation volatility in developing countries
with lower degrees of central bank independence and economic freedom. These results re-
veal the essential role played by strong institutions (such as central bank independence)
2For recent studies which present evidence of the negative impact of inflation levels and/or volatility on
growth, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chap. 12), Edison et al. (2002), Elder (2004), and Fatás and
Mihov (2005). But, it is worth noting that there is no widespread consensus on the relationship between
inflation and long-run economic growth. In fact, according to the survey of Temple (2000) the empirical
evidence of that relationship is mixed, and in Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) average inflation is not a robust
determinant of long-term growth.
3Woo (2003) shows that political instability and weak institutions are among the determinants of public
deficits.
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in deflecting the potential negative effects of political instability. While Aisen and Veiga
(2005, 2006) focused on the political, institutional and economic determinants of inflation
and seigniorage, this paper contributes to the literature by emphasizing the interaction be-
tween political and institutional variables in the determination of inflation volatility.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 describes the data and the
econometric models, Sect. 3 presents the empirical results, and Sect. 4 concludes the paper.
2 Data and the empirical models
Annual data on economic, political and institutional variables, from 1960 to 1999 were gath-
ered for 178 countries, but missing values for several variables reduce the number of coun-
tries in the estimations to at most 160. The sources of economic data were the International
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), the Penn World Tables—Mark 6.1
(PWT), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development
Network Growth Database (GDN), and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). Political and
institutional data were obtained from the Cross National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS);
the Polity IV Database, the State Failure Task Force Database (SFTF), Cukierman et al.
(1992), Sturm and de Haan (2001), and Gwartney and Lawson (2002).
The hypothesis that political instability and other political and institutional variables af-
fect inflation volatility is tested by estimating dynamic panel data models for standard de-
viations of inflation (taken from the IFS) for consecutive, non-overlapping, 3-year periods,
from 1960 to 1999.4 Since standard deviations of inflation have very high variability, their
logarithms, Log[SD(Inflation)], were used as our dependent variable. Our baseline model
includes the following explanatory variables:
• Lagged logarithm of inflation volatility (IFS), L.Log[SD(Inflation)]. Since this variable
accounts for the inertia that may exist in inflation volatility, a positive coefficient is ex-
pected.
• Log(Inflation): Logarithm of the inflation rate (IFS). According to Fischer et al. (2002),
there is a strong positive relationship between inflation levels and volatility. Thus, a posi-
tive coefficient is expected.
• Cabinet changes (CNTS): counts the number of times in a year in which a new premier is
named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers. Aisen and Veiga
(2006) showed that political instability leads to higher inflation, which implies that it in-
directly affects inflation volatility. By including cabinet changes in the model, along with
log inflation, we test the hypothesis that ministerial turnover also has a direct effect on in-
flation volatility (beyond the indirect one that operates through inflation rates). A positive
coefficient is expected, as greater political instability leads to more unstable economic
policies and, consequently, to greater inflation volatility.
• Ethnic Homogeneity Index (SFTF): ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating eth-
nic homogeneity, and equals the sum of the squared population fractions of the seven
largest ethnic groups in a country. For each year, it takes the value of the index in the
beginning of the respective decade. According to Woo (2003) higher social polarization,
which can be proxied by ethnic heterogeneity, leads to greater disparity in preferences
4The periods are: 1960–62, 1963–65, . . . , 1993–95, and 1996–99 (the last period is 4-years long). The mean
of the data is constant over the period for which the standard deviation is calculated. In robustness tests,
alternative period lengths are used.
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for different types of government spending and public deficits. Aisen and Veiga (2005)
showed that it leads to higher seigniorage. Consequently, greater ethnic homogeneity
should lead to lower inflation rates. Here, we test the hypothesis that it also affects in-
flation volatility directly. A negative coefficient is expected.
• Polity Scale (Polity IV): from strongly autocratic (−10) to strongly democratic (10). Ac-
cording to Aisen and Veiga (2006), democracy is associated with lower inflation rates. In
this model we test the hypothesis that it is also directly associated with lower inflation
volatility. A negative coefficient is expected.
The empirical model for inflation volatility can be summarized as follows:
Log[SD(Inf )]it = α Log[SD(Inf )]i,t−1 + β Log(Inf )it + δCCi,t + γ EHIit + λPSit
+ νi + εit, i = 1, . . . ,N, t = 1, . . . , Ti, (1)
where Log[SD(Inf )]it stands for the logarithm of the standard deviation of inflation of coun-
try i for the 3-year period t,Log(Inf ) for the logarithm of its inflation rate, CC for Cabinet
Changes, EHI for the Ethnic Homogeneity Index, and PS for the Polity Scale; α, β , δ, γ and
λ are the parameters to be estimated, ν are country-specific effects, and, ε is the error term.
It is possible that other variables that have been found to affect inflation levels also affect
inflation volatility directly. This possibility will be accounted for in robustness tests that add
other explanatory variables to this model. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in
the tables of results are shown in Table 1.
One problem of estimating this model using OLS is that Log[SD(Inf )]i,t−1 (the lagged
dependent variable) is endogenous to the fixed effects (νi), which gives rise to “dynamic
panel bias”. Thus, OLS estimates of this baseline model will be inconsistent, even in the
fixed or random effects settings, because Log[SD(Inf )]i,t−1 would be correlated with the
error term, εit , even if the latter is not serially correlated.5 If the number of time periods
available (T ) were large, the bias would become very small and the problem would disap-
pear. But, since our sample has only 13 non-overlapping 3-year periods, the bias may still
be important.6 First-differencing (1) removes the individual effects (νi) and thus eliminates
a potential source of bias:
D.Log[SD(Inf )]it = αD.Log[SD(Inf )]i,t−1 + βD.Log(Inf )it + δD.CCi,t + γD.EHIit
+ λD.PSit + D.εit, i = 1, . . . ,N t = 1, . . . , Ti . (2)
But, when variables that are not strictly exogenous are first-differenced, they become en-
dogenous, since the first difference will be correlated with the error term. Following Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator for linear dynamic panel data models that solves this problem by instru-
menting the differenced predetermined and endogenous variables with their available lags in
levels: levels of the dependent and endogenous variables, lagged two or more periods; levels
of the pre-determined variables, lagged one or more periods. The exogenous variables can
be used as their own instruments.
A problem of this difference-GMM estimator is that lagged levels are weak instruments
for first-differences if the series are very persistent (see Blundell and Bond 1998). According
5See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Baltagi (2001).
6According to the simulations performed by Judson and Owen (1999), there is still a bias of 20% in the
coefficient of interest for T = 30.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Observ. Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum Source
Log[SD(Inflation)] 1503 1.19 1.45 −4.28 9.47 IFS-IMF
Log(Inflation) 1505 2.10 1.35 −4.21 9.08 IFS-IMF
Cabinet Changes 1863 0.45 0.43 0.00 3.67 CNTS
Ethnic Homogeneity Index 1590 0.58 0.28 0.00 1.00 SFTF
Polity Scale 1702 −0.10 7.53 −10.00 10.00 Polity IV
Legal Index of Central Bank 653 0.35 0.12 0.09 0.69 CWN
Independence
Turnover Rate 664 0.24 0.21 0.00 1.08 CWN
Updated Turnover Rate 1064 0.23 0.21 0.00 1.10 CWN+SdH
Index of Economic Freedom 956 5.63 1.18 2.47 8.93 EFW
Log(Real GDP per capita) 1627 8.16 1.04 5.69 10.56 PWT
SD(GDPpc growth) 1582 4.44 4.59 0.03 51.41 PWT
SD(GDP growth of trading partners) 1757 1.19 0.81 0.01 7.39 GDN-WB
SD (Real Overvaluation) 1180 11.74 92.07 0.00 3082.55 GDN-WB
SD(change in oil prices) 2314 12.71 13.65 0.17 39.95 IFS-IMF
US Treasury Bill Rate 2314 6.04 2.26 2.70 11.14 IFS-IMF
Exchange Rate Regime 1132 4.09 1.12 1.00 5.00 LYS
Log[Trade (% GDP)] 1709 4.06 0.66 0.91 5.99 WDI-WB
Log[SD(Growth of M2)] 1606 2.33 1.27 −1.71 9.16 IFS-IMF
Government Crises 1829 0.18 0.37 0.00 3.00 CNTS
Political Instability Index 1 1824 −0.01 0.99 −0.61 7.77 PCA
Political Instability Index 2 1818 −0.03 1.14 −0.99 9.57 PCA
Political Instability Index 3 1818 −0.05 0.91 −0.89 6.33 PCA
Sources:
CNTS: Cross-National Time Series database;
CWN: Cukierman et al. (1992);
EFW: Gwartney and Lawson (2002);
GDN-WB: Global Development Network Growth Database—World Bank;
IFS-IMF: International Financial Statistics—International Monetary Fund;
LYS: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003);
PCA: Data generated by Principal Components Analysis on variables from CNTS;
Polity IV: Polity IV database;
PWT: Penn World Tables (Mark 6.1);
SdH: Sturm and de Haan (2001);
SFTF: State Failure Task Force database;
WDI-WB: World Development Indicators—World Bank
to Arellano and Bover (1995), efficiency can be increased by adding the original equation
in levels to the system. If the first-differences of an explanatory variable are not correlated
with the individual effects, lagged values of the first-differences can be used as instruments
in the equation in levels. Lagged differences of the dependent variable may also be valid
instruments for the levels equations.
3 Empirical results
The results of system-GMM estimations of our baseline model for a sample comprising
160 countries, with annual data from 1960 to 1999, are shown in Table 2. The model of
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Table 2 Inflation volatility for 3-year periods
Log[SD(Inflation)] 1 2 3 4
Log[SD(Inflation)](−1) .073 .029 .021 .008
(1.97)∗∗ (.79) (.60) (.23)
Log(Inflation) .806 .824 .944 .949
(15.29)∗∗∗ (15.29)∗∗∗ (13.90)∗∗∗ (14.50)∗∗∗
Cabinet Changes .804 .792 .547 .529
(3.10)∗∗∗ (3.38)∗∗∗ (2.65)∗∗∗ (2.19)∗∗
Ethnic Homogeneity Index −.380 −.374 −.314
(−2.59)∗∗∗ (−2.72)∗∗∗ (−1.96)∗∗
Polity Scale −.020 −.021 −.021
(−3.74)∗∗∗ (−3.93)∗∗∗ (−3.68)∗∗∗
Time −.217
(−3.83)∗∗∗
Time2 .013
(3.65)∗∗∗
# Observations 1275 1070 1070 1070
# Countries 160 135 135 135
Sargan test (p-value) .173 .378 .234 .356
Sources: See Table 1
Notes: – System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–1999;
– The dependent variable, Log(Inflation) and Cabinet Changes were treated as endogenous. Their
lagged values two and three periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and
their once lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation;
– In column 3, dummies for 3-year periods where included in the estimations;
– Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 2005,
correction).
– t -statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ∗∗∗, 1%;
∗∗
, 5%, and ∗, 10%;
– Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected
column 1 is a reduced version which includes only the first lag of the dependent variable
(log of inflation volatility), the log of the inflation rate, and cabinet changes. Although we do
not expect inflation levels to be affected by contemporaneous inflation volatility, Aisen and
Veiga (2006) showed that they are affected by Cabinet Changes. The latter can be affected
by inflation levels and volatility, as these will surely reduce the government’s popularity
and increase political instability. Thus, Log(Inflation) and Cabinet Changes were treated as
endogenous.7
7As done for the lagged dependent variable, their lagged values two and three periods were used as in-
struments in the first-differenced equations and their once-lagged first-differences were used in the levels
equation.
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All variables are statistically significant and have positive signs, as expected. Thus, there
is evidence of inertia in inflation volatility, although small, as the estimated coefficient is
only 0.073. The results also indicate that there is a strong positive relationship between
inflation levels and volatility (the coefficient for log inflation is 0.806), as found in previous
studies (e.g., Fischer et al. 2002). Finally, the hypothesis that Cabinet Changes, our proxy for
political instability, affect inflation volatility directly, and not only though inflation levels, is
clearly supported by our results. Furthermore, the effects are sizeable: an additional cabinet
change directly increases the standard deviation of inflation by a factor of about 2.23 ≈
exp(0.804), that is by 123%.8
Column 2 shows the results of the estimation of the complete baseline model. Adding
the Ethnic Homogeneity Index and the Polity Scale9 did not change the results concerning
Log(Inflation) and Cabinet Changes, but the first lag of inflation volatility is no longer
statistically significant.10 Furthermore, due to missing values, 205 observations were lost
and the number of countries dropped from 160 to 135. The two additional variables are
highly statistically significant and have negative signs, as expected. A one-point increase in
the Index of Ethnic Homogeneity (lower social polarization) reduces inflation volatility by
a factor of 1.46 ≈ exp(0.38), that is by 46%, while one point up the Polity Scale (greater
democracy) reduces it by 2%, in a way that goes beyond its effects through inflation levels.11
The results for our baseline model are practically the same when time effects are taken into
account. Dummy variables for 3-year periods were included in the model of column 3, and
a quadratic time trend was considered in that of column 4. In both cases, the results are very
similar to those shown in column 2.
The estimations whose results are presented in Table 3 test the hypothesis that greater
independence of the central bank leads to lower volatility of inflation. In column 1, we
added to the baseline model the Cukierman et al. (1992) legal index of central bank inde-
pendence (CBI), and, in column 2, we replaced it with the de facto index, the Turnover Rate
of central bank presidents.12 The results indicate that a higher turnover rate (lower de facto
independence) leads to higher inflation volatility, while legal independence seems to have
no effects.13 When the Turnover Rate is interacted with dummy variables for industrial and
developing countries (see column 3), the results indicate that higher turnover rates only lead
8The estimated indirect effect of cabinet changes is much smaller, although by no means negligible. Accord-
ing to Aisen and Veiga (2006), an additional cabinet change increases the inflation rate by 9.1%. Given that
in our model of column 1, inflation has an estimated coefficient of 0.806, an additional cabinet change would
indirectly (through the inflation rate) increase inflation volatility by about 7.3% ≈ (9.1% × 0.806).
9These two variables were treated as exogenous, as they are not affected by current inflation volatility.
10Since inflation volatility exhibited inertia in the model of column 1, for which there was a larger number of
observations and countries, we preferred to keep the lag of the dependent variable in the model, even though
it is no longer statistically significant. As will be shown in column 1 of Table 6, the results for a static model
are essentially the same.
11Although the effect of social polarization seems much larger than that of democracy, a one standard devia-
tion increase in the Index of Ethnic Homogeneity reduces inflation volatility by about 12.9% ≈ (0.28× 46%),
while a one standard deviation rise in the Polity Scale reduces it by 15% ≈ (7.53 × 2%). Thus, the impact of
these variables on inflation volatility is somewhat similar.
12The Cukierman et al. (1992) indexes of legal and de facto central bank independence (CBI) are the most
widely used in the literature. They are also the ones with the greatest coverage in terms of countries and time
period. For a description of available indexes of CBI, see Armone et al. (2006).
13The index of perceived central bank independence developed by Fry et al. (2000) is not statistically signifi-
cant when included. Since it is based on a survey conducted in 1999, we can assume that it represents CBI in
the 1990s, but no data is available for previous decades. It is possible that the lack of statistical significance
of this index of CBI is due to the low number of observations available.
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Table 3 Inflation volatility and central bank independence
Log[SD(Inflation)] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LVAW and TOR from Cukierman et al. (1992) TOR updated using
Sturm and de Haan (2001)
Log[SD(Inf.)](−1) −.057 −.057 −.064 −.045 −.040 −.041 .006
(−1.20) (−1.09) (−1.43) (−.86) (−.74) (−.81) (.11)
Log(Inflation) .896 .882 .845 .876 .862 .839 .840
(11.44)∗∗∗ (9.78)∗∗∗ (10.33)∗∗∗ (10.0)∗∗∗ (13.41)∗∗∗ (11.7)∗∗∗ (12.9)∗∗∗
Cabinet Changes .320 .440 .494 .393 .434
(1.47) (2.00)∗∗ (1.74)∗ (1.89)∗ (1.69)∗
Ethnic Homogeneity −.557 −.593 −.555 −.620 −.348 −.287 −.346
Index (−2.10)∗∗ (−2.47)∗∗ (−2.51)∗∗ (−2.40)∗∗ (−1.76)∗ (−1.46) (−1.80)∗
Polity Scale −.017 −.016 −.014 −.013 −.020 −.016 −.017
(−2.27)∗∗ (−2.15)∗∗ (−1.69)∗ (−1.70)∗ (−2.85)∗∗∗ (−2.21)∗∗ (−2.61)∗
Legal Index of CBI .142
(LVAW) (.25)
Turnover Rate (TOR) .727 .380
(3.23)∗∗∗ (1.95)∗
Turnover Rate ∗ .575 −.419
Industrial Countries (.82) (−.62)
Turnover Rate ∗ .888 .415
Developing Countries (2.88)∗∗∗ (1.82)∗
Cabinet Changes ∗ .837 .525
High Turnover Rate (2.44)∗∗ (1.86)∗
Cabinet Changes ∗ .110 .044
Low Turnover Rate (.36) (.23)
# Observations 455 455 455 455 751 751 725
# Countries 58 57 57 57 91 91 91
Sargan test (p-value) .883 .910 .457 .766 .320 .227 .447
Sources: See Table 1
Notes: – System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–1999;
– In each estimation, the lagged values two and three periods of the dependent and of the endoge-
nous variables were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-
differences were used in the levels equation;
– Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 2005,
correction).
– t -statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ∗∗∗, 1%;
∗∗
, 5%, and *, 10%;
– Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected
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to greater inflation volatility in developing countries. These results are consistent with those
of Cukierman et al. (1992), who found that legal CBI was related to lower inflation only
in industrial countries, while de facto CBI led to lower inflation levels and volatility in de-
veloping countries, but not in industrialized countries. Brumm (2006) also found a strong
negative relationship between CBI and inflation in developing countries.14
It is also possible that the effects of political instability depend of the degree of indepen-
dence of the central bank. This hypothesis was tested in column 4, where Cabinet Changes
was interacted with dummy variables for high and low turnover rates.15 The results indicate
that additional cabinet changes lead to higher inflation volatility only when turnover rates are
high (when there is low de facto central bank independence). This implies that independent
central banks can achieve stable inflation even in the face of political instability.
Since the Cukierman et al. (1992) Turnover Rate (TOR) does not cover the 1990s and is
not available for many of the countries included in our sample, we complemented it with
the TOR computed for developing countries by Sturm and de Haan (2001), for the 1980s
and 1990s. This increased the number of observations from 455 to 751 and the number of
countries from 57 to 91. The results presented in columns 5 to 7 are very similar to those of
columns 2 to 4, although the estimated coefficients and the degree of statistical significance
of variables related to CBI generally are lower.
Another proxy of institutional quality that may affect inflation volatility is the Index of
Economic Freedom (Gwartney and Lawson 2002), which Aisen and Veiga (2006) found
to be negatively related to inflation levels. Higher values of that index are associated with
smaller governments, stronger legal structure and greater security of property rights, access
to sound money, greater freedom to exchange with foreigners, and more flexible regulations
of credit, labor and business. The Index of Economic Freedom was added to our baseline
model in the estimation of column 1 of Table 4. Surprisingly, the coefficient has the wrong
sign and is not statistically significant. Since democracy and economic freedom are corre-
lated, this could be due to multicollinearity. Thus, the Polity Scale was excluded from the
model of column 2. Although the Index now has the expected negative sign, it is still not
statistically significant. This does not mean that economic freedom does not affect inflation
volatility. Since it affects inflation levels which, in turn, affect inflation volatility, the result
implies that the effects of economic freedom on inflation volatility are indirect and, thus, do
not seem go beyond those operating through the level of inflation.
It is also possible that economic freedom affects the relationship between political in-
stability and inflation volatility. That hypothesis was tested in column 3, where Cabinet
Changes was interacted with dummy variables for greater and lesser economic freedom.16
The results are supportive of the hypothesis, as a greater number of cabinet changes leads
to greater inflation volatility only when economic freedom is low. Thus, as happened with
central bank independence, better institutional quality dampens the effects of political insta-
bility.
In general, relative to developing countries, industrial countries have stronger economic
institutions, such as independent central banks and efficient tax systems, rely less on
14For surveys of empirical studies focusing on the effects of CBI on inflation, see Berger et al. (2001) and
Armone et al. (2006). Both surveys conclude that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation is quite
robust.
15High Turnover Rate takes the value of 1 when the Turnover Rate is greater than 0.33 (central bank governor
replaced every 3 years on average), and equals zero otherwise. Low Turnover Rate = 1−High Turnover Rate.
16High Economic Freedom takes the value of one when the Index of Economic Freedom is greater than 5, and
equals zero otherwise. Low Economic Freedom = 1 − High Economic Freedom.
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Table 4 Inflation volatility, economic freedom and industrialization
Log[SD(Inflation)] 1 2 3 4
Log[SD(Inf.)](−1) .018 .009 .007 −.003
(.43) (.19) (.12) (−.07)
Log(Inflation) .915 .895 .773 .805
(12.2)∗∗∗ (11.4)∗∗∗ (9.24)∗∗∗ (13.9)∗∗∗
Cabinet Changes .478 .463
(2.77)∗∗∗ (2.56)∗∗
Ethnic Homogeneity Index −.358 −.480 −.372 −.316
(−2.22)∗∗ (−2.89)∗∗∗ (−1.69)∗ (−1.80)∗
Polity Scale −.019 −.013
(−2.37)∗∗ (−2.44)∗∗
Index of Economic Freedom .023 −.040
(.33) (−.64)
Cabinet Changes ∗ .124
High Economic Freedom (.43)
Cabinet Changes ∗ 1.082
Low Economic Freedom (2.77)∗∗∗
Cabinet Changes ∗ −.028
Industrial Countries (−.10)
Cabinet Changes ∗ .796
Developing Countries (3.49)∗∗∗
# Observations 766 766 678 1070
# Countries 109 109 109 135
Sargan test (p-value) .773 .731 .248 .493
Sources: See Table 1
Notes: – System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–1999;
– In each estimation, the lagged values two and three periods of the dependent and of the endoge-
nous variables were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-
differences were used in the levels equation;
– Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 2005,
correction).
– t -statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ∗∗∗, 1%;
∗∗
, 5%, and ∗, 10%;
– Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected
seigniorage revenues (see Aisen and Veiga 2005) and have more stable economic policies
(see Fatás and Mihov 2005). Thus, one would expect political instability to have greater
effects on inflation volatility in developing countries. The results shown in column 4 sup-
port this hypothesis, as Cabinet Changes are associated with greater inflation volatility in
developing countries, but not in industrial countries.
Public Choice (2008) 135: 207–223 217
Table 5 presents the results of robustness tests which consist of adding to the baseline
model of column 2 of Table 2 economic variables which may affect inflation volatility. The
first is the log of Real GDP per capita (PWT), which we expect to have a negative impact on
inflation volatility, since as argued above, richer and more industrialized countries generally
have stronger economic institutions. The results shown in column 1 are consistent with this
hypothesis, as Log(Real GDP per capita) has a negative and statistically significant coef-
ficient. Aisen and Veiga (2006) showed that GDP per capita growth affected inflation. In
column 2, we test the hypothesis that more volatile growth, which can result from greater
incidence of shocks to the economy, leads to greater inflation volatility. We find support for
this hypothesis, as the coefficient on growth volatility is positive and statistically signifi-
cant.17
Greater volatility of external shocks could also lead to higher inflation volatility. In col-
umn 3, we add the standard deviation of GDP growth of trading partners (GND-WB), which
has the expected positive sign, indicating that more volatile growth abroad leads to greater
inflation volatility. Then, in column 4, we included the standard deviation of Real Overvalu-
ation (GDN-WB) of the exchange rate. The results confirm our prior that more volatile real
exchange rates lead to higher inflation volatility. The volatility of the Change in oil prices
(IFS-IMF) has a positive and weakly statistically significant coefficient in column 5, indi-
cating that external shocks originated in oil markets may affect inflation volatility at home.
We expect higher US Treasury Bill rates to lead to greater costs of external financing and
induce greater reliance on seigniorage revenues and, consequently, greater inflation levels
and volatility. The results shown in column 6 are consistent with this hypothesis.
The exchange rate regime could also play a role, as fixed rates are expected to restrict
discretionary monetary policy and, thus, reduce inflation volatility. The Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2003) exchange rate regime indicator, which varies from 1 (flexible rates)
to 5 (fixed rates), is included in the model of column 7, but is not statistically significant.18
Trade openness is accounted for in column 8, in which we include Log[Trade(%GDP)],
taken from WDI-WB. According to Bowdler and Malik (2005), trade openness reduces
inflation volatility by limiting the reliance on seigniorage revenues and by shifting con-
sumption towards goods with stable terms of trade. Granato et al. (2006) conjecture that, if
openness leads to a more aggressive inflation-stabilizing monetary policy, there should be a
negative relationship between openness and the variance of inflation. The results shown in
column 6 are consistent with the above-mentioned hypotheses and with the empirical results
obtained in the referred studies.
Finally, in column 9 we add the log of the standard deviation of the growth rate of M2
(IFS-IMF) to the model. This variable is highly statistically significant, the estimated coef-
ficients of Cabinet Changes and Ethnic Homogeneity Index are considerably smaller than in
the baseline model (see column 2 of Table 2), and the Polity Scale is no longer statistically
significant. These results indicate that the effect of political and institutional variables on
inflation volatility operate through more volatile money growth.
It is worth noting that the results regarding the variables included in the baseline model
are practically the same across the nine specifications shown in Table 5. That is, regardless
of the economic variables that are entered, our conclusions concerning the effects of political
instability, social polarization and democracy on inflation volatility remain the same.
In the estimations of Table 6, we analyzed the sensitivity of the results concerning the
baseline model to alternative specifications and samples: static model (column 1); model
17Real GDP per capita and the volatility of real GDP growth were treated as endogenous variables.
18The same result is reported for inflation levels by Aisen and Veiga (2006).
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Table 6 Sensitivity analysis
Log[SD(Inflation)] 1 2 3 4 5
Static model Regional Developing All except Inflation
dummies countries Latin America <1000%
Log[SD(Inflation)](−1) .013 .021 .034 −.015
(.33) (.57) (.98) (−.43)
Log(Inflation) .847 .824 .833 .739 .778
(17.62)∗∗∗ (14.59)∗∗∗ (13.88)∗∗∗ (11.57)∗∗∗ (13.56)∗∗∗
Cabinet Changes .559 .738 .702 .858 .786
(2.39)∗∗ (3.56)∗∗∗ (3.26)∗∗∗ (4.25)∗∗∗ (3.29)∗∗∗
Ethnic Homogeneity Index −.475 −.430 −.178 −.524 −.405
(−3.14)∗∗∗ (−2.90)∗∗∗ (-1.12) (−3.36)∗∗∗ (−2.74)∗∗∗
Polity Scale −.019 −.015 −.014 −.025 −.021
(−3.18)∗∗∗ (−2.78)∗∗∗ (−2.55)∗∗∗ (−3.95)∗∗∗ (−3.98)∗∗∗
Africa .160
(1.30)
Eastern Europe .288
(1.60)
Middle East .333
(1.87)∗
Western Hemisphere .199
(1.73)∗
Other Countries .706
(2.90)∗∗∗
# Observations 1185 1070 842 841 1061
# Countries 142 135 116 114 134
Sargan test (p-value) .193 .400 .475 .406 .341
Sources: See Table 1
Notes: – System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–1999;
– The dependent variable, Log(Inflation) and Cabinet Changes were treated as endogenous. Their
lagged values two and three periods (2 to 5 periods in the static model) were used as instruments in
the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation;
– Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 2005,
correction).
– t -statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ∗∗∗, 1%;
∗∗
, 5%, and ∗, 10%;
– Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected
that includes regional dummies (column 2); sample including only the developing countries
(column 3); sample excluding Latin American countries (column 4); and sample excluding
observations for which the inflation rate was equal to or greater than 1000% (column 5). The
results are practically the same as those of column 2 of Table 2 (the baseline model); ex-
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cept that the Ethnic Homogeneity Index is not statistically significant when only developing
countries are included in the sample (column 3).
Finally, in the estimations of Table 7, four proxies for political instability were entered
into the baseline model, as alternatives to Cabinet Changes, and regressions also were run
on a sample of 5-year consecutive and non-overlapping time periods. Column 1 presents the
results of the baseline model for samples of 3-year and 5-year periods. Then, in column 2,
Cabinet Changes was replaced with Government Crises, defined as rapidly developing situ-
ations that threatened the downfall of the government (CNTS). Although this variable is not
statistically significant for 3-year periods, it is so for 5-year periods.19
Considering that political instability is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, eventually not
well captured by just one variable, we constructed three alternative indexes of political in-
stability by applying principal components analysis.20 The variables (all from the CNTS)
used to define each index were:
• P.I. Index 1: Assassinations, Cabinet Changes, Constitutional Changes, Coups, Executive
Changes, Government Crises, and Revolutions.
• P.I. Index 2: Assassinations, Constitutional Changes, Coups, Government Crises, and
Revolutions (following Woo 2003).
• P.I. Index 3: Cabinet Changes, Executive Changes, and Government Crises.
Columns 3 to 5 present the results for these 3 indexes of political instability, which are al-
ways statistically significant, with the expected positive signs. The results are very similar to
those of the baseline model and, thus, support the hypothesis that higher political instability,
higher social polarization and less democracy lead to higher inflation volatility.
4 Conclusions
Using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample cover-
ing 160 countries, analyzed in the period from 1960 to 1999, this paper finds that higher de-
grees of political instability and social polarization, less democracy, and lower institutional
quality, such as lack of central bank independence, lead to more volatile inflation rates. We
clearly show that those variables are important determinants of inflation volatility, and have
sizeable direct effects, which go beyond their indirect effects operating through seignior-
age and inflation levels already documented in the literature (see Aisen and Veiga 2006, for
inflation levels, and Cukierman et al. 1992, and Aisen and Veiga 2005, for seigniorage rev-
enues). Our results concerning the strong positive relationship between inflation levels and
volatility are also consistent with previous findings (see, among others, Fischer et al. 2002;
Granato et al. 2006; and Bowdler and Malik 2005).
Another contribution to the literature is the identification of circumstances under which
greater political instability leads to higher inflation volatility. Our results indicate that this
positive relationship is present for low degrees of de facto central bank independence (high
turnover rate of central bank presidents) and economic freedom, as well as in developing
19It is also statistically significant for samples of four- or eight-year periods (results available upon request).
20This technique for data reduction describes linear combinations of the variables that contain most of the
information. It analyzes the correlation matrix, and the variables are standardized to have mean zero and
standard deviation of 1 at the outset. Then, for each of the three groups of variables, the first component
identified, the linear combination with greater explanatory power was used as the political instability index.
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Table 7 Alternative proxies of political instability and time periods
Log[SD(Inflation)] 1 2 3 4 5
Cabinet Government Political Political Political
Changes Crises Instability Instability Instability
Index 1 Index 2 Index 3
3-year periods
Log[SD(Inflation)](−1) .029 .017 .023 .019 .031
(.79) (.46) (.69) (.52) (.88)
Log(Inflation) .824 .833 .856 .852 .841
(15.3)∗∗∗ (16.5)∗∗∗ (16.5)∗∗∗ (16.0)∗∗∗ (15.6)∗∗∗
Proxy of Political Instability .792 .093 .165 .231 .327
(see column heading) (3.38)∗∗∗ (.64) (2.45)∗∗ (3.00)∗∗∗ (3.10)∗∗∗
Ethnic Homogeneity Index −.380 −.354 −.328 −.344 −.451
(−2.59)∗∗∗ (−2.33)∗∗ (−1.98)∗∗ (−2.30)∗∗ (−2.98)∗∗∗
Polity Scale −.020 −.020 −.014 −.018 −.024
(−3.74)∗∗∗ (−3.81)∗∗∗ (−2.38)∗∗ (−3.24)∗∗∗ (−4.80)∗∗∗
# Observations 1070 1075 1070 1069 1069
# Countries 135 135 135 135 135
Sargan test (p-value) .378 .160 .223 .252 .366
5-year periods
Log[SD(Inflation)](−1) .089 .102 .073 .076 .102
(1.58) (1.77)∗ (1.28) (1.39) (2.03)∗∗
Log(Inflation) .899 .747 .856 .826 .783
(11.2)∗∗∗ (7.43)∗∗∗ (9.25)∗∗∗ (8.55)∗∗∗ (8.89)∗∗∗
Proxy of Political Instability .548 .706 .178 .273 .457
(see column heading) (1.77)∗ (3.07)∗∗∗ (1.92)∗ (2.41)∗∗ (2.92)∗∗∗
Ethnic Homogeneity Index −.332 −.460 −.312 −.413 −.508
(−2.02)∗∗ (−2.52)∗∗ (−1.70)∗ (−2.24)∗∗ (−3.34)∗∗∗
Polity Scale −.021 −.027 −.018 −.023 −.034
(−3.38)∗∗∗ (−4.41)∗∗∗ (−3.44)∗∗∗ (−4.18)∗∗∗ (−5.01)∗∗∗
# Observations 642 645 642 642 642
# Countries 132 132 132 132 132
Sargan test (p-value) .176 .167 .172 .158 .235
Sources: – See Table 1
Notes: – System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–1999;
– The dependent variable, Log(Inflation) and the Proxy of Political Instability (indicated in the column
headings) were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and three periods were used as
instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in the
levels equation;
– Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 2005,
correction).
– t -statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ∗∗∗, 1%;
∗∗
, 5%, and ∗, 10%;
– Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected
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countries. But, when central bank independence or economic freedom are high, or in indus-
trial countries, political instability does not seem to affect inflation volatility. Thus, these
results imply that the relationship holds only for low levels of institutional quality. It is also
worth noting that our results indicate that de facto central bank independence leads to lower
inflation volatility in developing countries, but not in industrial countries, which confirms
the results of Cukierman et al. (1992).
We believe that this paper’s analysis and conclusions are a valuable contribution to acad-
emics and policymakers alike. By enhancing economic freedom and reforming institutions,
developing countries can create viable mechanisms conducive to long-run price stability.
Smaller governments, greater security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom to
exchange with foreigners and more flexible markets (all elements of economic freedom), and
greater central bank independence constrain the policymakers’ monetary and fiscal choices,
limiting the ill effects of political instability and of opportunistic or populist policies. Thus,
by improving the quality of their institutions, developing countries could go a long way
towards long-term economic prosperity.
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